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A considerable proportion of research in the field of violence risk assessment has focused 
on the accuracy of clinical judgements of offender dangerousness.  This has largely 
been determined through research which compares the accuracy of clinical predictions 
of offender dangerousness or future violence to mathematical predictions.  What has 
been less researched is the influence of decision making heuristics and biases on clinical 
judgements of violence risk assessment.  The current paper discusses decision making 
heuristics and biases and applies the theory to clinical judgements in a violence risk 
assessment context.  Based on the current review, it is suggested that in order to improve 
the effectiveness clinical judgements in violence risk assessment, a greater level of 
empirical research specifically examining the effects of the heuristics and biases in 
this context must be conducted, with the possibility of incorporating debiasing 
training into clinical practice. 
 




An individual’s ability to process information is often lower than the high volumes of 
information available to them (Baron & Byrne, 1997).  In order to contend with this, 
cognitive strategies are employed which act to decrease the cognitive effort 
required, while maintaining a relatively effective means of interpreting the high levels 
of social information available.  These strategies, referred to within social psychology 
as decision making heuristics or ‘cognitive rules of thumb’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), are inherent in human decision making.  While the use of heuristics within day 
  




to day decision making most certainly can be considered beneficial (e.g., in 
reducing the volume of complex cognitive processing, thus cognitive effort, required 
in decision making), their use has repeatedly been shown to lead to errors in 
judgement (Pennington, Gillen, & Hill, 1999).  The current article shall provide an 
overview of the use of heuristics and their associated biases within decision making.  
More specifically, it shall discuss the application of decision making theory to the 
practice of violence risk assessment within a clinical setting.  This application is of 
particular importance given that, currently, only 14% of the 29 clinical psychology 
training programmes running in Britain indicate that any specific training or 
instruction on decision making biases is incorporated into their programmes* (please 
see Appendix A).  
  
The illusory correlation 
 
Within the violence risk assessment literature, a number of decision making biases 
have been highlighted as being important to clinical judgement accuracy.  Elbogen 
(2002) suggested that clinicians may make illusory correlations when assessing the risk 
of violence.  An illusory correlation exists when a decision is influenced by the 
perception of a correlation existing between two entities that may not actually be 
correlated (Chapman & Chapman, 1967).  This has clear implications within risk 
assessment practice, as no correlation between risk cues has been consistently 
found to exist (Hart, 1998).  For example, Quinsey and Maguire (1986) found that in a 
sample of experienced forensic clinicians, judgements of dangerousness were 
based largely on the seriousness of the individual’s offence and the frequency of 
assaultive behaviour displayed by the individual while in the institution.  The 
researchers compared these perceived risk factors to those actually occurring in 
cases of recidivism (measured over an 11 year period) and found the actual risk 
factors that were successful in predicting dangerousness to be: seriousness of 
offence, history of crime, criminal commitment (rather than civil commitment), 
young age and the number of previous correctional confinements.  Thus, the 
clinicians’ consideration of seriousness of offence and frequency of assaultive 
behaviour acting as significant cues associated with dangerousness was only half 
supported, with the latter cue having no relationship to offender behaviour following 
release.  Based on their findings, Quinsey and Maguire (1986) asserted that a 
‘dangerous’ individual released from a psychiatric institution tended to be young 
and male, with a history of property crimes and serious crimes against people.  In 
discussing research, such as that conducted by Quinsey and Maguire (1986), 
however, it must be highlighted that a clinical consideration of a patient being 
‘dangerous’ may not be a prediction of violent behaviour, but may represent an 
opinion that the individual is capable of committing serious and significant harm to 
  




others (Litwack, 2001).  Thus, when discussing risk cues in relation to predictions of 
dangerousness, one must consider the context in which the terms are considered; a 
murderer may have fewer or no previous offences but this does not make him or her 
any less dangerous than an individual with many previous offences, in fitting with 
Quinsey and Maguire’s (1986) typical profile of a ‘dangerous’ individual who is likely 




In addition to considering the context of the terminology used, discussed above, 
when conducting a violence risk assessment one must consider the context in which 
the assessment is taking place and the reasons for the assessment.  Borum (2000) 
illustrated this point by discussing the difference between an assessment made in an 
emergency room under volatile conditions in comparison to one made as part of an 
institutionalised risk management procedure.  In the case of a volatile setting, such 
as an emergency room, the clinician will have very little time to decide upon the 
course of action, and as such will not base his or her decisions upon a 
comprehensive review of all of the documentation associated with the case.  
Decisions in this type of situation are necessarily made quickly, based on the 
situational factors.  On the other hand, in cases where there is time afforded (such as 
the decision to discharge an individual from a secure facility), the clinician will base 
his or her decision choices on a larger amount of information, utilizing the suitable 
documentation and interview information available to them.  Borum (2000) 
highlighted that one of the most significant judgemental errors in violence risk 
assessment is the failure to properly consider the influence of situational factors.  
These situational factors are of the utmost importance when considering the level of 
risk that an individual poses, however, and assessing an individual in a context 
completely removed from their normal situation may prove hazardous to the 
assessment.  For example, if the individual is known to be prone to behaving violently 
when under high levels of peer pressure (e.g., from gang members or other peer 
groups ‘triggering’ this type of behaviour), then the likelihood of the individual 
behaving violently in this company is higher than if they were not exposed to this 
type of company.  However, the likelihood of the individual experiencing triggers to 
violent behaviour is often greater out with institutionalised life, and the clinician must 
therefore take this into account when composing a violence risk assessment in these 
circumstances.  Indeed, a specific set of structured professional guidelines are now 
available to assess the risk of violence based on situational factors (i.e., Promoting 
Risk Intervention by Situational Management by Johnstone & Cooke, 2008), further 
  




emphasising the importance of the situation on the level of risk posed by an 
individual. 
 
The representativeness heuristic 
 
Similar implications to those discussed above for the practice of violence risk 
assessment may exist with the presence of representativeness in clinical decision 
making, particularly in relation to the illusory correlation.  Representativeness 
describes the process by which the probability of an event occurring is evaluated 
based on the extent to which this event resembles another that is perceived by the 
individual to be related to the target (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  In a clinical 
setting, representativeness may be more clearly described in terms of an individual 
judging one case based on its perceived similarity to other cases.  This aspect of 
human decision making is often applied to stereotyping or categorising people into 
specific groups.  For example, in research conducted by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1982), participants were given the following scenario: 
 
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright.  She majored in 
philosophy.  As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in antinuclear 
demonstrations.  Please check off the most likely alternative: 
 Linda is a bank teller 
 Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement”  
 
The majority of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1982) participants chose the latter option, 
despite the logical probability of the latter option (co-occurrence of two events) 
being mathematically less likely than the former (single event occurrence).  This 
phenomenon was labelled the conjunctive fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), with 
the above example illustrating the way in which individuals categorise people into 
specific groups and make assumptions about others’ beliefs and attitudes based on 
their own preconceived notions.  However, as judgements influenced by 
representativeness ignore the laws of probability, as demonstrated in the above 




Similarly, the way in which individuals perceive events and their environment may be 
affected by these preconceived notions.  Individuals are known to not only seek out 
information that conforms to their own expectations (i.e., selective exposure; 
  




Sargent, 2007), but also to attend to and perceive information (environmental or 
otherwise) in a way that is consistent with their expectations and interests (Plous, 
1993; Salemink, van der Hout, & Kindt, 2007).  This selective perception was famously 
illustrated by Bruner and Postman (1949).  These researchers presented participants 
with five playing cards for between 10 milliseconds and one second.  One of these 
cards did not conform to the standardised playing card suits (red heart, red 
diamond, black spade, and black club), but was instead a ‘black heart’.  
Participants in Bruner and Postman’s (1949) experiment took over four times as long 
to recognise this trick card than those belonging to the normal suits, with the majority 
of the participants displaying a dominance reaction in which the card was 
perceived to be either a ‘normal’ red heart or black spade, in line with their prior 
expectations.  These findings illustrate that an individual’s prior expectations can 
strongly influence their perception of an event or object, and therefore their 
judgements made based on this perception.  Indeed, Plous (1993, pg.17) went as far 
as to state that “When people have enough experience with a particular situation, 
they often see what they expect to see.” 
 
Regarding clinical judgements in violence risk assessment, selective perception may 
be apparent in a number of ways.  For example, through person perception when 
meeting an offender, or through attending to specific information consistent with the 
clinician’s preconceived notions and disregarding non-congruent information when 
assessing the client’s case.  In the first example given, clinicians may look for or 
attend to visual or behavioural cues consistent with their pre-existing schema of an 
offender.  If this was the case, a stereotyped view of the offender would result, 
possibly influencing the judgements being made about the individual.  Much like the 
use of heuristics and biases in human decision making, stereotyping has been 
discussed as a necessary cognitive process (Lippmann, 1922), used to reduce and 
edit the vast amount of sensory input into something manageable and meaningful 
to the individual (Stewart, Powell, & Chetwynd, 1979).  In addition, Stewart et al. 
(1979) described stereotyping as a process not only used to simplify environmental 
and social stimuli, but one that also aids the construction of meaning to those stimuli 
based on attributional expectations.  With regards to person perception, Taguiri 
(1969) discussed the process as the way in which an individual knows and thinks 
about others, and how they consider their characteristics, qualities and inner states 
in order to infer information about their intentions, attitudes and emotions.  Once 
considered a veridical process that was central to social interaction, it is now more 
commonly considered that not all characteristics can be so easily or accurately 
inferred as once thought; instead, a relatively small number of traits are considered 
to be easily inferred through the process of person perception (Stewart et al., 1979).  
It is therefore argued that as there is a relatively large proportion of information 
  




about another individual that cannot be inferred directly through person perception, 
the remaining ambiguous information required in order to infer another individuals’ 
characteristics, attitudes and intentions is completed through the process of 
stereotyping.  However, it is well documented that inferences made about 
individuals and their intentions are not always correct.  For example, while it has 
been found that reference to ‘satanic’ interests has a strong influence on mock 
juror’s finding a defendant guilty (Pfeifer, 1999), Charles and Egan (2009) 
demonstrated that such ‘gothic’ interests that are assumed to be predictive of 
offending behaviour are actually mediated by personality, and that intrasexual 
competition and low-agreeableness actually acted as better predictors of offending 
behaviour.  These researchers proposed this finding as evidence to challenge the 
stereotypical view that individuals with unusual or ‘gothic’ interests are more likely to 
be dangerous or act in an anti-social manner. 
 
Thus, should any inference be drawn based on a relatively small number of 
observable characteristics about an individual who is being assessed for violence 
risk, some concerns over the accuracy of these inferences may be raised.  However, 
as the use of cognitive shortcuts is an evolved process, and as clinicians are known 
to rely on intuition to produce these types of judgements on a regular basis, one may 
argue that this concern is largely redundant.  When the latter example given is taken 
into consideration with the notion of stereotyping, however, valid issues relating to 
the impact of inferring characteristics based on few observable characteristics may 
be raised.  That is, should clinicians attend to or seek out information that is consistent 
with their preconceived notions and disregard information not fitting with their 
hypothesis at the initial stages of assessment (i.e., confirmation bias), they will be less 
likely to seek information opposing their initial schema of the case and will therefore 




Confirmation bias has been observed in numerous domains outwith clinical 
judgement (Ask, Rebelius, & Granhag, 2008).  One such observation, which is of 
relevance when considering clinical judgement, is the influence of an interrogator 
on judgements made in interrogative settings.  Kassin, Goldstein, and Savitsky (2003) 
induced either a high or low degree of suspicion of guilt in a mock interrogation 
study.  The authors found that those participants (acting in the role of interrogator) 
who had been predisposed to an expectation of ‘high guilt’ interrogated their 
suspect in a manner which implied guilt presumption to a greater extent than their 
counterparts in the ‘low guilt’ condition (e.g., participants in the ‘high guilt’ group 
were seen to press suspects harder in to gain a confession of guilt than those in the 
  




‘low guilt’ group).  This example is of particular relevance to clinical judgement, as it 
highlights the nature of pre-existing assumptions or beliefs on the way in which an 
authoritative figure may act towards a person under investigation (whether that is 
under interrogation or under assessment for violence risk).  Further to this example, 
Ask et al. (2008) investigated investigator perceptions of evidence reliability.  The 
evidence was manipulated to either confirm or disconfirm the suspect of a mock 
murder case as the perpetrator.  Of particular interest to the present article’s focus, 
clinical judgement in violence risk assessment, were the findings relating to the 
witness evidence.  It was found that witness identification evidence was considered 
to be less reliable when it challenged (disconfirmed) the suspicions against a suspect 
than when it confirmed them.  This is an important parallel to draw against clinical 
judgement in a violence risk assessment context, as information given by offenders 
which is of a positive nature (e.g., the assertion that an individual has never used 
illicit substances) ought to be treated with more suspicion than negative information 
(e.g., admissions of committing unrecorded offences).  It is clear to see that the 
reliability of this information is not equal across confirmatory and non-confirmatory 
information (as shown by Ask et al., 2008).  It is, however, also important to take this 
into account when assessing the risk of violence posed; as preconceived notions are 
known to not only influence the information sought and attended to in the first 
instance, but also the perceived reliability of this information, the clinician will be 
more likely to conduct a biased risk assessment.  
 
One reason, demonstrated by Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch, and Lockhart 
(1998), which may help to account for reliance on preconceived notions and 
subsequent seeking of confirmatory information, is that non-preferred information 
(i.e., dissonant information) requires more effortful cognitive processing than 
preferred information (i.e., information consonant with a hypothesis).  As such, it is 
clear to see that as human judgement, particularly in time-constrained 
environments, relies on cognitive biases, seeking and attending to confirmatory 
information is yet another evolved way to reduce cognitive effort in judgement and 
decision making.  Borum, Otto, and Golding (1993) proposed corrective measures to 
decrease the influence of this bias on clinical judgment.  The authors suggested that 
clinicians should seek information that is in opposition to their initial hypotheses during 
the data gathering stages of case assessment.  This process would act to modify the 
initial impressions of a case if and where necessary.  Borum et al. (1993) further 
suggested that this disconfirmatory information should be considered alongside the 
other data gathered, thus preventing the sole consideration of information that 
supports the clinician’s original impressions of and hypotheses about a case. 
 
  




The availability heuristic 
 
Similar implications may arise from the use of the availability heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973, 1974) when conducting a violence risk assessment.  The availability 
heuristic occurs when an individual unconsciously judges the probability of an event 
occurring, for example, by the ease with which it can be retrieved from memory.  
Thus, more recently available information is retrieved from memory faster and with 
greater ease and is therefore perceived as more important, likely or frequent than 
less easily retrieved information.  For example, in cases of high profile murders 
involving teenagers, great media interest is taken (Charles & Egan, 2009).  In the 
case of Luke Mitchell, who was found guilty of murdering his girlfriend, it was widely 
reported in the press that he had ‘satanic’ interests (HMA v Luke Mitchell, 2004).  As 
pointed out by Charles and Egan (2009), while the level of evidence to support the 
causal effect of these kinds of cases is varied, the assumption is not often strongly 
questioned.  With the wide reporting of causal links between satanic interests and 
high profile murder cases, in combination with the unchallenged nature of these 
claims, it is fair to say that the causal link, whether true or not, may become 
engrained into acceptance, and thus a stereotyped view will emerge.  As this 
stereotype is then more readily available as part of an individual’s general schema 
(i.e., a cognitive shortcut), it is therefore more easy to access from memory and, 
according to the availability heuristic, will be considered as more likely than less 
easily conceived alternatives, as illustrated in the aforementioned research by Pfeifer 
(2009).  This decision making heuristic is thought to arise from an inability on the part 
of the individual making judgements to imagine sources of uncertainty or construct 
relevant hypothetical situations.  In relation to violence risk assessment, a number of 
risk assessment tools have been developed that may help to reduce the effects of 
availability.  For example, the HCR-20 (Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart, 1997) and 
the PRISM (Johnstone & Cooke, 2008) encourage the user to develop ‘same-’, ‘best-
’ and ‘worst-’ case outcome scenarios, and therefore develop suitable risk 
management plans for each of these hypotheses.  Thus, with the correct use of 
these relatively new semi-structured violence risk assessment tools, the biasing 
influence of the availability heuristic on clinical judgments of violence risk assessment 
can at worst be reduced and at best be negated. 
 
Learnability and the hindsight bias 
 
Of key concern in violence risk assessment from a decision making and judgement 
point of view is the fact that little to no feedback is provided to clinicians after the 
event.  That is, once the violence risk assessment and follow-ups, where possible, 
  




have been completed, the individuals involved in conducting the violence risk 
assessment and developing the risk management plan will not be made aware of 
the success, or indeed failure, of the assessment and interventions suggested.  This 
has a number of implications in terms of judgement accuracy.  First, the concept of 
learnability (Bolger & Wright, 1994; Thomson, Onkal, Avcioglu, & Goodwin, 2004) must 
be considered.  According to this concept, in situations where there is little or no 
performance feedback, judgment should be expected to be poor, and in the case 
of expertise, expert judgement should not be expected to be significantly better 
than that of a lay-person.  In the case of clinical assessments of violence risk, 
improving learnability is a difficult task, as often clinicians have a large workload and 
are under immense time pressure, and are therefore unable to supplement this poor 
feedback by, for example, scrutinising other clinician’s reports (which would be 
beneficial in terms of vicarious retrospective learning).  Second, the impact of 
hindsight bias on the judgments made in relation to the violence risk assessment must 
be considered.   
 
Hindsight bias (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975) describes the phenomenon whereby people 
are rarely surprised by the outcome of an event, even in cases where the outcome-
prediction was extremely unlikely and where the individual was not able to predict 
the outcome beforehand.  Thus, individuals are seen to exaggerate post-event what 
could have been anticipated with foresight pre-event.  In addition, individuals are 
unable to explain why the event was ‘predictable’ afterwards, despite having been 
unable to predict the outcome beforehand.  Borum et al. (1993) discussed the 
implications of hindsight bias affecting forensic assessments.  Borum et al. (1993) 
pointed out that hindsight bias is most likely to occur when clinicians are asked to 
assess the professional practice of a colleague in cases where an outcome (usually 
a negative outcome) has occurred post-assessment, typically in the instance of 
malpractice allegations.   
 
Based on Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, and Hart’s (1988) research, which found a 
reduced influence of hindsight bias in clinicians who had been made to create a list 
of alternative diagnoses as compared to those who had not, Borum et al. (1993) 
suggested that when assessing cases, the clinician should therefore create a list of 
possible outcomes that could have occurred in response to their colleague’s actions 
or interventions, in addition to noting alternative courses of action and their 
hypothetical possible outcomes.  While this would be effective in reducing hindsight 
bias, this course of action would not necessarily be beneficial in preventing the 
mistake being investigated from occurring in a wider population than simply the 
clinicians directly involved.   Hindsight bias is thought to occur due to the way in 
which memory is structured.  That is, memory is a constructive process and as such, 
  




memories are not exact copies of the past, but, rather, are ‘constructed’ with logical 
inferences and associated memories being used to fill in missing details (Plous, 1993).  
It has been noted that hindsight bias appears to reconstruct memory (Plous, 1993).  
That is, with the new information given (i.e., the outcome of the event), individuals 
incorporate this new information into their past memories, thus changing their 
recollection of the event in a way that makes more sense to the individual in light of 
this new information.  It is this reconstruction of memories in hindsight that prevents 
individuals from learning from their past mistakes.  Arkes et al.’s (1988) and Borum et 
al.’s (1993) suggestions of note taking and creating hypothetical situations and 
outcomes may, therefore, act to decrease hindsight bias through decreasing the 
over-reliance of the clinician on memory.  As Redelmeier (2005) pointed out, 
however, the possibility of learning from previous errors in a clinical setting is made 
difficult by the fact that often the errors made are too distal in time and place for the 
clinician to first, be aware of, and second, to learn from. 
 
A further strategy that may act to reduce hindsight bias was suggested by 
Dernevick, Falkheim, Holmqvist, and Sandell (2001).  These authors suggested that 
hindsight bias is brought about through the negative feedback loop that arises in re-
offending contexts.  That is, as the individuals who are correctly assessed as non-
violent are often not heard of again (i.e., as they do not re-offend, they do not re-
enter the system for risk assessment) and the individuals who are incorrectly assessed 
as non-violent but who do re-offend are the ones who are re-assessed for violence, 
clinicians are not able to adjust their heuristics or learn from their errors. In order to 
reduce the influence of hindsight bias (and improve risk assessment practice in 
general), therefore, Dernevick et al. (2001) suggested that group assessments 
involving experienced assessors ought to be conducted, whereby the assessors 
monitor one another’s assessments would act to increase the validity and decrease 
bias in assessment.  In addition, Dernevick et al. (2001) suggested that continuous 
training of staff, involving detailed feedback from all risk assessments carried out (i.e., 
outcome feedback to determine if an assessment was accurate or not) would 
further act to improve risk assessment.  In particular, this latter approach would act to 
reduce hindsight bias.  However, these ideals are not entirely practical in the real-





Tversky and Kahneman (1982) further outlined that the extent to which an individual 
is confident in their predictions or judgements depends largely on the level of 
representativeness present in their decision making (i.e., the level of closeness of their 
  




judgement to that upon which they are basing their choice).  Thus confidence can 
be considered to be high when an individual’s interpretation is a close match to 
their target, regardless of probability.  This effect is maintained even when the 
individual has been made aware of the limiting factors in their predictions 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).  This ‘illusion of validity’ is highly applicable to violence 
risk assessment: as clinicians involved in violence risk assessment are often required to 
predict the likelihood of an offender committing future crimes, the clinician’s 
confidence in his or her own decisions must be reasonably high, for both moral and 
ethical reasons.  For example, if a clinician’s confidence in his or her judgement of a 
specific case is relatively low, it would not then be ethical for them to make 
recommendations regarding offender treatment within a courtroom setting. 
 
McNeil, Sanburg, and Binder (1998) investigated the effects of confidence on 
decision accuracy in clinicians working in a psychiatric unit.  These authors found 
that clinicians displayed greater decision making accuracy when they were highly 
confident and lower accuracy when less confident.  They suggested that the use of 
actuarial tools as a supplement may act to increase clinician confidence in 
circumstances where confidence in clinical judgement is low, thus improving 
decision making.  Further to this, Rabinowitz and Garelik-Wyler (1999) found that 
while confidence was not significantly related to accuracy in violence prediction, 
higher levels of confidence existed when predicting non-violent behaviour than 
when predicting violent behaviour.  These authors suggested that with higher 
confidence in predicting non-violent behaviour, clinicians may engage in greater 
risk-taking behaviour, in that no preventative measures would be applied. 
 
Under-using base rate data 
 
In addition, with the use of representativeness in decision making, it has been well 
established that base rate data go largely underused (Monahan, 1981).  To clarify 
what is meant by ‘base rates’ in the present context, Borum (2000, pg.1275) 
provided a succinctly defined the term as: “the known prevalence of a specific type 
of violent behaviour within a given population over a given period of time.”  In a 
classic example, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) presented participants with a 
number of fictitious personality descriptions depicting different characters.  
Participants were told that the descriptions were drawn from a sample of 100 
professionals, either 70 engineers and 30 lawyers or 70 lawyers and 30 engineers, and 
were asked the likelihood of the character in the description being either an 
engineer or a lawyer.  Based on the numerical information provided, one would 
logically expect to find a higher response of ‘engineer’ in the former example and a 
  




higher response of ‘lawyer’ on the latter example.  However, the authors found that 
participants across the two conditions produced the same likelihood of the 
individual being described as being either a lawyer or an engineer.  From these 
findings the researchers concluded that the judgements made were largely 
dependent on the descriptive factors within the personality profiles provided rather 
than on the actual statistical probabilities associated with the categories.  In a 
violence risk assessment context, Monahan (1981) indicated that by not consulting 
base rate information, the accuracy of violence risk assessment is greatly reduced, 
and asserted that in assessing the level of risk of violence that an individual poses 
base rates for violence should be a key consideration.  It can be seen that 
acknowledging base rates is of the utmost importance in increasing the accuracy of 
judgements made and that therefore, with an over-reliance on representativeness, 
important aspects such as numerical information providing statistical probabilities 
becomes redundant in judgements made.  However, often the events that merit risk 
assessment in a clinical context are highly individual, providing low base rates for 
comparison, if these rates are indeed available.  Borum (2000) therefore suggested 
that whether base rate information is available or not, it is of great importance to 
consider the risk assessment as an individualised case, and that the clinician must 
recognise that, while base rate information can be of use when anchoring a 
prediction of the likelihood of future violence, there may be some relevant, recurring 
risk factors in a particular case that are not generally found in the population as a 
whole. 
 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic 
 
In addition to the representativeness heuristic and the availability heuristic, discussed 
earlier, the final ‘classic’ heuristic (Cioffi, 1997), anchoring and adjustment, described 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), shall now be discussed.  The anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic describes the tendency of people to make estimates of an 
outcome based on an initial value (the anchor) and adjusting from this anchor in 
order to reach a final judgement.  One possible circumstance that an anchor on 
which a clinician could weight their decision may come about in a violence risk 
assessment context is during the interpretation and review stages of case 
assessment.  When reviewing and assessing a case, clinicians will typically have 
access to the previous risk assessment information and evaluations conducted.  With 
the presentation of such information, the assessing clinician may form an anchor 
based on, for example, previous assertions of low-, medium-, or high- risk of the 
individual acting violently or through the outcomes of actuarial assessments of risk 
that may have been conducted.  In addition, an anchor can be formed not only 
when provided to the clinician explicitly; an anchor can also be the product of an 
  




incomplete computation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  With regards to clinical 
judgment, this has been discussed in terms of forming an anchor based on 
information that has been gathered in the earlier stages of the evaluation, therefore 
affording less weight to the ‘newer’ information, leading to insufficient adjustments to 
the initial impression formed of the case (Borum et al., 1993), and also through the 
personal knowledge and experience held by the clinician through his or her clinical 
experience acting as a baseline or anchor on which judgments are based (Cioffi, 
1997). 
 
While, of course, the violence risk assessment must include and incorporate 
information gathered from previous risk assessments and be based on clinical 
experience and knowledge, it has been shown that typically individuals weight the 
initial value, the anchor, too highly and therefore are prone to making insufficient 
judgments away from the anchor value (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  Thus, the outcome of the judgment will be dependent on this 
starting point, and it has been shown the magnitude of the estimates or judgments 
associated with this starting point are biased towards the initial value. 
 
One way in which this issue could be resolved is for the clinician to solely use an 
actuarial tool to assess the risk of violence.  These tools were developed in order to 
remove the clinician’s own ‘subjective’ judgements of the case from the assessment 
(Reeves & Rosner, 2009), and instead act to predict the risk of violence based on the 
statistical weighting of the risk cues measured by the particular tool being used.  
While the removal of the clinician’s own judgments may certainly reduce, or indeed 
remove, the risk of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic affecting the outcome of 
the assessment, actuarial tools have been highly criticised within the literature for 
being too rigid, based on historical data and therefore not taking into account 
dynamic variables pertinent to the case either presently or in the future, and that 
they provide no indication of how best to manage the predicted level of risk 
(Douglas, Ogloff, & Hart, 2003).  Thus, while neither method is perfect, it is likely that 




Though not strictly speaking a decision making bias, the influence of attribution on 
clinical judgements in violence risk assessment must be acknowledged.  Devernick 
et al. (2001), again, emphasised the importance of considering context.  The 
researchers highlighted the fact that the majority of research relating to violence risk 
assessment has been conducted in a controlled, experimental manner, and that 
  




considerably fewer studies have focused on data collected in a manner 
representing actual clinical practice (i.e., collected in the field).  This is an important 
distinction to draw, as in the research context the research does not have any direct 
influence in the process of risk assessment, and as such is objective.  In practice, 
however, the clinician has a real life, direct influence on the assessment procedure.  
In addition, the assessment made by the practitioner may also be affected by the 
real world circumstances surrounding a case.  For example, Devernick et al. (2001) 
suggested that the clinician may attribute causal relationships when reviewing 
information about an offender, such as attributing the cause of delinquent 
behaviour seen in later life to childhood events.  As discussed by Murray and 
Thomson (2009), attribution effects can be detrimental to the treatment and 
assessments of offenders; should an internal cause (e.g., a personality trait) be 
attributed as the cause of an offender’s behaviour, the treatment and overall risk 
rating will be markedly different than for an offender whose behaviour has been 
attributed to an external cause (e.g., need for money).  For a more detailed 
discussion on attribution effects on clinical judgements of violence risk assessment 
see Murray and Thomson (2009).  
 
Points of departure 
 
While there are some studies specifically investigating the effects of heuristics and 
biases on clinical judgements of violence risk assessment (e.g., Devernick et al., 2001; 
Murray, Thomson, Cooke & Charles, in press; Quinsey & Cyr, 1986), much work is still 
required in this area (Elbogen, 2002).  Accordingly, a number of pointed future 
directions for research in this area shall now be suggested, based on the reviewed 
literature presented in the current manuscript: 
 
• First, as indicated by Elbogen (2002), a greater deal of descriptive research is 
required to investigate what actually occurs in clinical practice.  This type of 
research would provide the best possible platform on which to build 
experimental research on, thus allowing the experimental research to be 
applicable to practice, not only theory. 
• Clearly, research which is targeted to investigating the influence of specific 
heuristics and biases on clinical judgements of violence risk assessment is 
required.  Empirical research in this area would allow the field to move on from 
the mainly theoretical links between these concepts being presented as 
possible factors in violence risk assessment, as has been presented in the 
current review and those of the past (e.g., Borum, 2000; Borum, Otto, & 
Golding, 1993).  With empirical findings from well designed studies, based on 
both the theoretical links and on actual practice, not only would more 
  




information become available in the academic literature, but this knowledge 
could be used to best improve decision making and judgement in clinical 
judgement, where appropriate. 
• Before embarking upon research into the effects of heuristics and biases on 
judgements of violence risk assessment, the most appropriate heuristics and 
biases for investigation must first be identified.  The present article has outlined 
a number of appropriate heuristics and biases for possible investigation.  
However, based on the current review, the authors suggest that targeted 
investigation into the following biases is of particular importance: attribution 
effects; selective perception; confirmation bias; and hindsight bias.  These 
particular biases have been highlighted as particularly important in terms of 
initial investigation as they are somewhat less theoretically based and as such 
research into these biases can be most readily based on, and, therefore, 
applied to clinical practice.  This is not, however, to say that research into the 
remaining heuristics and biases discussed should not be conducted; just that 
more theoretically based research would be required in these areas before 
application to practice could be achieved. 
• With regard to attribution effects on clinical judgements of violence risk 
assessment, there are already published empirical articles in this area.  For 
example, Quinsey and Cyr (1986) and Murray et al. (in press) found that 
clinicians and lay people alike rated offender dangerousness (among other 
traits) differently across internally and externally manipulated crime based 
vignettes.  Specifically, offenders depicted in internally manipulated vignettes 
were considered to be significantly more dangerous than those depicted in 
the external manipulations.  However, while these researchers illustrated that 
differences exist, their findings do not give information about whether or not 
this is a positive or a negative effect.  That is, do these attribution effects 
negatively affect judgements of violence risk assessment, or are they 




From the discussed research it can be seen that the use of heuristics and their 
associated biases in clinical decision making can indeed be problematic in terms of 
achieving the greatest accuracy in predicting violent behaviour.  However, it has 
been suggested that by being made aware of their use of biases, clinicians can 
improve the quality, thus accuracy, of their risk assessments (Borum et al., 1993; 
Elbogen, 2002).  It is therefore concluded that, in order to improve the effectiveness 
of violence risk assessments and to improve clinical judgements in this context, it may 
  




be beneficial in clinical practice to incorporate some form of biases training.  
However, prior to this it is necessary for a greater level of up to date empirical 
research examining the effects of the different heuristics and biases discussed in the 
current paper on clinical judgements of violence risk assessment to be conducted in 
order to assess both whether the administration of biases training would indeed be 
beneficial in this context, and also to identify which heuristics and biases may exert 
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*Data gathered via a simple telephone survey asking: 
“I understand that you deliver training in clinical psychology.  I am currently writing a 
paper discussing the impact of decision making biases on clinical decision making in 
violence risk assessment and would like to ask a quick question regarding your 
course training.  Do you currently include de-biasing training or any other form of 
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